Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
276/2015
GIGA Working Papers under authoritarian rule, because COs are viewed as "schools of democracy," as Tocqueville once called them, or "bulwarks of democracy" (Hyden 2010: 253) . However, since the end of the "transition paradigm" (Carothers) -and even before that -many political scientists, as well as scholars in the field of regional research, have viewed COs with a critical eye. Early on, the so-called "dark sides" of COs were referred to and their rather more negative role in supporting democratization pointed out. Edwards and Foley (1996) , Chambers and Kopstein (2001) , Lauth (2003) , and Roth (2004) , for example, carried out critical studies focusing on the tendency towards violence, corruption, intolerance, and other deficits of "civil ethos" within civil societies and COs (Kern et al. 2010: 3) . Wischermann (2013a, b) has analyzed COs in Vietnam and described the widespread development of intra-organizational authoritarianism in all types of organizations in the country -something that makes those organizations, at least in principle, supporters of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) and the state it rules. Hai Hong Nguyen (2014) asserts that there are "limited governance mechanisms within Vietnamese CSOs to make their activities accountable" and questions whether these organizations follow "the fundamental principles of democracy, in this case transparency and accountability" (154). In a seminal article, Thayer Answering the very first question, which is predominant in political science-related research on authoritarian regimes, seems to involve exploring the "conditions" that impact COs. Here a variety of "factors" are enumerated and their impact on the internal make-up, the goals, and the activities COs pursue are named and/or explored in detail. These factors include historical and sociocultural influences, the strongly service-centered role many COs play, the family centeredness and the "kinship ethos" of COs, clientelism, neopatrimonialism, and so on. Many of these studies, which are barely comparable, study developments in the Middle East (Jamal 2007) , North Africa (Liverani 2008) , and southern Africa (Vidal and Chabal 2009 ). For the region of Asia and in a rather general sense, the role of the state in the economic, political, and social development process and its impact on the development of COs has also been explored (Alagappa 2004) .
Recently, the research on COs has taken an interesting turn. Maneuvering out of the schism between those who see COs as fighters for democracy and those who see COs as helping to preserve authoritarian rule, Cavatorta (2013) suggests shedding the "transition paradigm" and moving towards "an understanding that liberalized authoritarian regimes
[…] may be a relatively stable equilibrium" (3). Furthermore, he suggests joining Berman (2006) in her assumption that COs and "(t)he growth of civil society should not be considered an undisputed good, but a politically neutral multiplier -neither inherently 'good' nor 'bad', but dependent for its effects on the wider political environment and the values of those who control it" (Berman 2006: 266) . Cavatorta (2013) then goes on to conceptualize the interdependency between (authoritarian) state/s and society/ies, which he conceives of not as separate and in opposition but as "on a sort of continuum where the two meet to cooperate or to come into conflict" (2). He finally suggests analyzing "the conditions under which such dynamics take effect" and strengthening "an emerging research agenda which focusses more on the variations of civil society activisms within authoritarian regimes than on the extent to which they promote or thwart democratization" (3; emphasis in original).
In our view this is a fruitful, though descriptive, approach, since it opens up the opportunity to explore COs and their activities without taking a teleological perspective. Even more important is that Cavatorta suggests thinking about the impact of authoritarian constraints on COs in relational ways. A relational perspective takes into account that whatever "conditions" influence COs, these organizations are also part of those conditions and influence them. In examining state-CO relationships, relational thinking helps to avoid potential tautologies and supports the development of a new research agenda.
Despite this (and other) turn(s), scholars researching authoritarianism only rarely refer to -a theoretically underpinned understanding of the role of the state;
-the actual sources of state power, beyond how it utilizes political-economic resources, and what, besides rational and calculating self-interest, nourishes the will to maintain such power; -how power in autocratic regimes is exerted in practice on a daily basis and how it is upheld in everyday life;
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-how certain ways of exerting power, on the one hand, and acceptance or resistance, on the other, are linked.
"Bringing in a theoretically reflected understanding of the state" while also "bringing society back in" are two of the central desiderata of autocracy research (Kailitz and Köllner 2013: 25) .
Even more rarely, in this same context of political science research on authoritarian (and democratic) regimes, do we find reference to critical analyses of state and power. Here an article by Göbel (2011) should be pointed out. Through the unusual combination of various discussion strains, he develops an understanding, based theoretically on Mann (1984) and Lukes (1975 Lukes ( /2001 , of the (authoritarian) state, its forms of power, sources of power, and activities, and also suggests how such an understanding can be operationalized. He differentiates between three forms of state power: "despotic power," "infrastructural power," and "discursive power" (Göbel 2011: 187) . Gerschewski (2010) reaches similar conclusions when he identifies three "pillars" of power in authoritarian regimes: repression, co-optation, and legitimation (Gerschewski 2010: 8) . 3 This article takes inspiration from various schools of state and power analysis. In our differentiation between the infrastructural power and the discursive power of the authoritarian state, we have followed Göbel's suggestion.
For the case of Vietnam, we argue that in a general sense various forms of state power (infrastructural power and discursive power) appear to be strong, but that they seem to be exercised to a varying degree: Whereas the impact of infrastructural power appears to be strong and seems to have almost the same impact on all types of COs, the discursive power of the state seems to be a bit weaker and its impact appears to vary according to the type of CO. The state's infrastructural power leads to intra-organizational authoritarianism, but the discursive power of the state does not have a similarly strong impact. These findings might have implications for developmental cooperation with and potential support for various types of Vietnamese COs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: After a brief outline of the theoretical framework in Section 2, Section 3 presents the methodological considerations. The empirical findings are outlined and discussed in Section 4. In our conclusion (Section 5), we reinterpret 
Theoretical Framework
In keeping with the primarily exploratory intention of this paper, we base our investigation on a "focused theory frame" (Rueschemeyer 2009: 1) . The assumptions operating here and the frame of reference that is established lead to hypotheses, some of which also contain causalities. The former do not, however, inevitably result in a closed theoretical principle.
Our understanding of state is informed by a combination of different schools of state and power analysis. We link the findings on the genesis and the necessity of "state power" (Mann) with the traditions of hegemony-related and, in a very limited sense, governmentalityrelated theories (Poulantzas, Jessop, Gramsci, Lukes) . We enrich both of these with the findings of gender research (Sauer) . According to our understanding, the state is the institutionalized result of societal conditions and conflicts, and state institutions are part of a field of social and economic forces (Sauer 2011: 133) . We thus comprehend the state as a social relationship -an institutionalization and "material condensation of the relationship of social forces" (Poulantzas) -within which certain societal forces and ideas can temporarily achieve hegemonic positions. 4 In this paper, we speak of an authoritarian state when the following conditions exist:
-When the state and its actions only allow political pluralism to a limited and constantly fluctuating extent, and when the state demonstrates permissive tolerance -which can be revoked at any point -for "divergent" opinions.
-When the state reacts to people who are politically, ethnically, religiously, or sexually "different" by limiting their options for action or expression.
-When a leader or a small group exercises power within boundaries that have not been formally defined but are actually quite predictable.
-When the leader or the small ruling group has largely been exempted from political accountability.
-When the authoritarian state has appropriated elements of various, differentiated concepts of consensus and communality, propagating them and promoting their dissemination through the media and societal organizations. Such concepts are meant to remedy differences among classes, social strata, ethnic groups, religious communities, and genders. They imply the precedence of an imagined society over the individual, and that the individual's granting of consent will lead to a supposed consensus; furthermore, they 4 As regards the definition of the state, we use the "working definition" Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985) developed. According to their definition, it should be recognized "that across a range of historical circumstancesin ways that vary substantially -the state tends to be an expression of pacts of domination, to act coherently as a corporate unit, to become an arena of social conflict, and to present itself as the guardian of universal interest. Clearly these tendencies stand in contradiction to each other and cannot all at once come into their own" (Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985: 48; emphasis in original) .
Due to a lack of space we leave out a broader discussion of why we do not see differences based on principles between various forms of state power in authoritarian and democratic polities. We refer, following Mann (1984) , to the state's "despotic" and "infrastructural power" and,
following Lukes (1975 Lukes ( /2005 , to its "discursive power" as the three key forms of state power.
For pragmatic reasons we focus on the infrastructural and discursive power of the state. 5
Infrastructural state power is essentially about political control of society. Here, institutions, social services, and procedures come into play that offer citizens incentives to act in a certain way on the one hand and make it possible for the state to react flexibly when faced with societal problems and pressure "from below" on the other. In general, infrastructural power denotes the "logistics of political control" (Mann 1984: 192) . More specifically, infrastructural power signifies the "capacity of the state to penetrate and coordinate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm" (Mann 1984: 189) . As Göbel (2011: 184) rightly notes, this definition refers to three approaches to infrastructural power -"namely, 'state capabilities', their 'subnational variation', and their impact on society, that is, the 'weight of the state' (Soifer 2008: 236-242) ."
We term the first specific form of infrastructural power "control through the provision of services to the people." Maintaining control of a society makes necessary not only means that concern the central administration, internal security, and other similar domains, but also those in the realm of social welfare. Here the implementation of social services that help the state to mitigate social problems and counter possible political conflicts by improving the social conditions of single groups or several groups of citizens, and thus to exert control over society, are very important. The contributions of COs within the framework of state programs in the public health sector, especially those for inhabitants of urban problem areas ("socially marginalized groups"), make it possible for the state to manage these areas and their residents, are effective means of pacification, and help maintain this form of infrastructural power.
The second form of infrastructural power can be termed "control through limited participation." In order to achieve more or better control over certain groups and individuals, the state gives preference to certain societal groups and certain organizations representing them (for example, associations of businesspeople), allowing them to participate within fixed limits in policy-formation, decision-making, and implementation processes. At the same time, the state denies the participants access to the advance decision-making committees and any The discursive power of the state is a means with which to secure the active participation of the objects of power in their own self-restraint (Jessop 2008: 147) . We understand discursive power in the sense of Lukes, and differently from Foucault, as the "power employed by agents of the state through/on discourse" (Göbel 2011: 188, FN 7) , and thus as the exertion of power through the controlling of societal discourse and the shaping of understandings of societal or political issues, historical events, and so on. Our understanding of power has been informed by Lukes's (1975 Lukes's ( /2005 ) "radical view of power" and its understanding of the two dimensions of state power: "power over someone" and "power to" (Lukes 1975 (Lukes /2005 . One example of coercion through discursive state power selected for this paper is the influence of such power on norms that affect both gender relationships and the understanding of gender in general, and the involvement of COs in the construction and maintenance of such narratives. (Kößler 1994) .
In this article, authoritarianism at the level of COs as organizations and at the level of individual or group behavior within the COs is identified, described, and evaluated according to the understanding of authoritarianism put forward by Stenner (2005) . Fundamental to our understanding of authoritarianism is Stenner's assumption (2005) that authoritarianism repudiates individual self-determination and autonomy and strictly negates the supremacy of the individual over a group or a system. Authoritarianism is an ensemble of attitudes and ways of acting that link the uncompromising denial of difference and diversity with an unconditioned demand for homogeneity and uniformity. This in turn leads to coercive action towards and suppression of people who are "different" (Stenner 2005: 16-20) .
Methodological Considerations
From a methodological point of view, this paper presents the results of an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units. Thus, it presents and analyzes the results of a case study. 7 The single unit is Vietnam, and similar units are other postsocialist countries under authoritarian rule (such as Laos, Mozambique, Angola, Algeria, and at some point also Cuba). The cases are COs, and the observations for each case are collected for a range of variables.
Such a study is especially useful if and when the research breaks new scientific ground and if and when the research pursues rather limited aims. This applies here in three ways:
First, in terms of the theoretical background of this article. As mentioned above, especially in the context of political science-based research on authoritarianism, an approach based on the critical analysis of the state and state power is seldom found. Second, as a consequence thereof, there is no broad corpus of literature in which the assumption that specific forms of state power, specific resources of state power, and specific "mechanisms" and processes lead to the development of specific features within COs and in their relationships with the state.
Third, in a relatively limited sense this paper aims to explore assumptions and develop hypotheses. Drawing on the results of our study, further case studies, small-N projects, and maybe even large-N projects could try, in a general sense, to validate our assumptions and hypotheses.
We have chosen the case of Vietnam for some general and some specific reasons. In this paper we pursue a variable-based explanation in combination with mechanismand process-based explanations. We assume that various forms of authoritarian state power lead to observable processes of action that help to establish patterns of intra-organizational authoritarianism within COs, that bring COs into positions subordinate to and dependent on the state, and that let COs reproduce the gender images and norms propagated by the state.
More specifically, we assume that various mechanisms lead to traceable and observable processes of intra-organizational authoritarianism, bring COs into positions subordinate to the state (and the party), let COs reproduce ideational certainties that the state (and the party) stands for in the field of gender norms, and help to embed the Vietnamese state into Vietnamese society (though this happens to a varying degree and extent). Such mechanisms include the following:
-The "principles" of "democratic centralism" and mechanisms and practices related to this Leninist organizational principle as codified in the Vietnamese Constitution (2013) City (because it is only in such big cities that all types of COs are present). We selected an even distribution of organizational types: four mass organizations (two in each city), four professionals' organizations (two in each city), four business organizations (two in each city),
four NGOs (two in each city), and four faith-based organizations (two in each city).
The most important criteria in choosing COs was that they should be important in maintaining the (authoritarian) state -for example, by providing services in the public health sector, by supporting the legitimacy of the state through improvements to economic and social policies, or by reinforcing norms that support the state's gender-related policies.
In-depth interviews were carried out between June and August 2014. 10 The Vietnamese interviewers wrote reports of these interviews, which were then translated into English.
These translated reports, which total 221 pages, form the basis of the empirical analysis presented in the next section. The citations stem from these reports and have been anonymized for obvious reasons. A list of all the organizations interviewed and the interview dates is included at the end of the paper.
Empirical Findings and Discussion
Here we differentiate between infrastructural power in general ("control of the society") and two forms of infrastructural power in particular: "control of the society through the provision of social welfare" and "control of the society through limited participation." We also discuss discursive power.
individual party members are de facto subordinate to the group authority of the local parties (and the members of a CSO board that applies this principle are subordinate to the group authority of the management board) (Wischermann 2013a 
Infrastructural Power in General
There were two key findings. First, we found that the interviewees from various mass organizations, professionals' organizations, and business organizations 11 stick to and apply various principles of "democratic centralism." This implies, for example, that prior decisions are taken by a small group of people; that the principle of "collective leadership, individual responsibility" is adhered to; and that after a vote the minority has to follow the opinion of the majority. Second, we found that these interviewees are firmly and solidly integrated into the political-administrative system of the party and the state. The Communist Party has the final say in all aspects concerning the "human resources" of the respective organizations and the activities they pursue.
All the COs whose representatives we interviewed are under the leadership of the party, these people make the most important decisions.
Nevertheless, most if not all interviewees claimed that their organization's internal decision-making processes are at least consultative, which means that the opinions of all leadership personnel are heard. For example, the interviewee from the Hanoi-based NGO SCDI stressed that the group's internal decision-making processes are "bottom-up":
12 Note, however, that despite the fact that the Vietnam Economics Association (VEA) is not a "special association" and not directly supported by the state, its leading personnel (and others) follow the party's leadership.
The citation on page 23 provides a good example of this. The organization's decisions are made based on the discussions between the management team and staff. Depending on the nature of the decisions, the discussions may be held at three levels: among groups of staff, among groups of management, and between the leaders and the board of directors. An annual staff retreat is organized for all the organization staff to identify and make up decisions on the next year's activities.
[…] The decisions on activities are made relying on the multilevel discussions (weekly board meeting and monthly staff meeting However, the rest of the data suggest that the director takes the most important decisions and that it is also he or she who has the most responsibility. Such top-down decision making might be justified based on this responsibility, since ultimately no one but the director is ac- but not all NGOs apply certain principles related to the state's and the Communist Party's organizing principle of democratic centralism. What makes things even more remarkable is that these organizations' representatives (at least those interviewed) seem to believe in the usefulness of such principles. However, there might be a difference in the understanding of this principle when it is applied within NGOs. In the case of SCDI, the application of this principle means that the board of directors, the management team, and the "CEO" and founder of the organization (more or less) together decide on the activities and orientation of the organization. A difference between decision making in the party and the state and in COs is not discernible when it comes to the application of another principle related to democratic centralism -that which says that the minority follows the opinion of the majority after a de- In faith-based organizations, mechanisms related to democratic centralism cannot be identified. Here it is the founder, the abbot, the "Superiors," the "older Sister," and the like who have the final say in terms of the organization's activities and how these are carried out.
The same is true with regard to who leads the respective organization.
In other words and in general terms, almost all the (interviewed) COs are hierarchically structured and their internal decision-making processes follow a top-down model. What this means in practical terms is illustrated by the representative of the VCCI: "The head of the organization holds the highest authority to decide and is responsible for the operation of the organization. Democracy sometimes just does not work!"
It is particularly the way internal decisions are made and followed that fit with Stenner's definition of (organizational and other forms of) authoritarianism. This definition has at its core that the autonomy of the individual and the individual him-or herself are subordinate to the group and its decisions. The adherence to the principle that the minority follows the opinion of the majority after a decisive vote is a good example of how authoritarianism in Stenner's sense works and is understood in practice. Based on the analysis of the interviews we carried out, we conclude that most if not all of the 20 COs are structured in quite an authoritarian manner.
Such intra-organizational authoritarianism is strongly supported by the rejection of compromise and the view of consensus as the ultimate goal of decision-making processes. We see both as closely related to the mechanisms used within the state apparatus and the VCP (which controls this apparatus) -for instance, democratic centralism.
Compromises and compromising (in the sense the questionnaire defined them) are not widely used, if at all, according to the 20 CO representatives interviewed. 15 Some did not even understand, or at least pretended not to understand, the term (thỏa hiệp) (for example, the interviewee from the faith-based organization Mai Linh Shelter means to reach a consensus (đồng thuận). Reaching consensus seems to be the ultimate objective, and this consensus, which can also be simply the majority vote and/or the will and opinion of the most influential people in the organization, has to be followed by the minority and/or those who are not "fully" convinced. What seems undeniable is that mass organizations, professionals' organizations, and business organizations (at least those we interviewed) are integrated in one way or another into the specific system of rule the VCP has erected. However, this does not mean that those COs do not (at least partly) have their own agenda, especially in terms of the activities they develop; that CO staff and clientele have no "voice" (for example, there are lively debates inside the mass organizations on various, and even sensitive, topics); that COs' room to maneuver is limited; or that there are no problems in the relationships between those in power and societal organizations of various types. In fact, the situation is quite the contrary: Although decisions on activities are made mostly in a top-down and hierarchical manner, it is in these decisions regarding activities that the Communist Party's control (VCP representatives are present in mass organizations, professionals' organizations, and business organizations and are organized in cells and committees) seems to be less strict -relative to decisions concerning the selection of personnel. This implies a certain flexibility with regard to activities. In terms of personnel, the Communist Party not only has a decisive voice, but in some Limiting the state's and party's control of the society is the fact that COs have only the means of "persuasion" at their disposal (as one representative of HUBA in Ho Chi Minh City so aptly put it) and that they do not have power in the strictest sense of the word. In addition to control, the party and the state both need persuasion to achieve and maintain society's consent to their rule (that is, to have legitimacy). It is here that the results of our survey regarding the impact of the state's "discursive power" come into play. We come back to this point later (see pp. 25-26 and p. 27).
To conclude this section, we now present our findings on the constraints and opportunities within the Vietnamese state's general political-administrative structures. We are interested in these structures because they might provide strong incentives for COs to behave and act in a certain way.
The Legal-Administrative Framework
The majority of respondents assessed the legal-administrative framework as being "partly enabling/partly restrictive." There was a certain tendency for the interviewees from the North to view the legal-administrative framework as "enabling," while interviewees from the South were less likely to see it in this way.
The more critical position articulated by most respondents from Ho Chi Minh City did not seem to be politically motivated. Rather, it had to do with these southern COs' frustrations regarding the paperwork to be done and the bureaucracy entailed in working with the local state. However, it was not just the representatives of various types of COs in Ho Chi
Minh City who referred to administrative, financial, and other bureaucratic problems as "re- provided by the representatives of mass organizations, "special associations," and, most importantly, COs under the direct leadership of the party. At least within the previous three years (the period referred to in the interview guidelines), they seem to have felt encouraged to expand their roles and activities, or at least did not feel hindered in the activities they undertook and the roles they played.
The Roles COs Play
The data suggest that in terms of roles, the legal-administrative framework encourages COs to play the role of an advocate first, the role of a service provider second, and the role of a bridge between state and society third. 18 How strong is the legal-administrative framework's impact on COs? Our answer would be that most of them -namely, mass organizations, professionals' organizations, and business organizations -have to play a certain sociopolitical role (which is clearly defined and binding), but that the legal-administrative framework also supports some choices and discourages others. This implies that groups' roles can vary and be broadened to a certain extent. This encouragement and discouragement may be both direct and indirect. It is this backdrop of potential discouragement that helps one understand why the roles of a "watchdog" or a "lobby organization" are not chosen very often. Whereas the first role might be politically sensitive, whether they play the latter role depends on what organizations are lobbying for and how they do this. The potential subject of lobbying activities and the uncertainty as to how the party and the state might react may have caused those
COs we interviewed to be hesitant to play the role of lobbying organizations.
Infrastructural Power as "Control through the Provision of Services to the People"
Here we have applied a narrow understanding of COs providing services: only those organizations that receive support (in the broadest sense) from the state and whose provision of services takes place within a state-supported program. This narrow understanding was necessary because we wanted to identify direct links between the state and COs.
Of the COs interviewed, it is the mass organizations, professionals' organizations, business organizations, and one NGO that receive support from the state. None of the faith-based organizations receives state support. The former organizations participate in various state programs, and they deliver services either together with the state or alone. They are paid and/or provided with various nonmonetary benefits for these services.
In addition to paying for the services provided, the state pays for mass organizations' staff and "infrastructure" (buildings and offices, cars, etc.). The salaries, health insurance, pensions, etc. of mass organization personnel are on par with those of public servants. The state also pays for the staff and offices of "special associations" (professionals' and business organizations) and even of "normal" socio-professional organizations such as the Ho Chi Minh City Union of Business Associations (HUBA). In the latter case the state pays for the headquarters and the cars and provides funds "for party offices and the Union offices, while HUBA balances its own employees' salaries." If and when the state assigns single tasks to these organizations, they usually also receive the budget to fulfill the tasks.
18 Note that the Vietnamese term for "advocate" does not imply a confrontational stance or conflictual processes.
It is in this context that some discussions of the problems of translating the English version of the interview guidelines into Vietnamese are in order. The terms the Vietnam researchers chose were as follows: For advocate "biện hộ (cho quyền lợi một số đối tượng phục vụ)," which, roughly translated, means serving some people as regards their rights; for lobby "vận động chinh sách." The problem is that up until now there has been no suitable term in Vietnamese for "lobby"; therefore, the colleagues used a Vietnamese term that in its widest sense implies "to promote" and "to speak out for." For "watchdog" they used the term "giám sát,"
which literally means "to monitor." Here, again, no comparable Vietnamese term exists.
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In general, those COs providing services are not subject to direct discouragement of certain activities or specific clienteles, although one could read into various statements that the representatives do bear in mind that some activities could bring about negative reactions from the state and that more often than not they do not undertake them. Based on our data, we cannot conclude that there are clear limitations and "no-go areas" in terms of activities and clienteles that come with the work of service providers inside these programs. We do as- The participation in policy formulation has made the operation of the association much different from its previous operation. Previously, VLA served mainly its members.
Currently, the operation has been expanded to the public. VLA undertakes not only its regular tasks but also other missions. There are also activities that the association finds itself responsible for such as the organization of the workshop on the sovereignty over the seas and islands of Vietnam. There are also activities which the state and responsible authorities have assigned to the association, such as legal dissemination and participation in the settlement of complaints and denunciations. The relations with state agencies make the work of VLA easier because there are more tasks assigned to the association. Previously, VLA had less work than now. (VLA)
In the consultation on state policies related to businesses and trade, VCCI better communicates the needs and aspirations of the businesses to the state. At the same time, its participation in the activities of government (policy consultation, trade negotiations)
helps VCCI have access to and update information and policies, better serving the training courses and information provision programs that VCCI holds for businesses.
The participation in the policy-making process does not encourage VCCI to perform new activities, but it helps VCCI to do its current jobs better and to improve the quality and reputation of the services it provides. Providing state policy consultation does not change the relations between VCCI and state agencies. (VCCI)
In a different way, the representative from SCDI stressed the advantages that participation in advocacy (such as policy formulation concerning drug users, prostitutes, and gays/lesbians) brings. Such activities help build confidence among the organization's target community and among policy makers, convincing them "that SCDI is not using them to make its own profits."
There is no indication, based on the interviews, that consultations on state policy formulation take place on a regular basis. Rather, the empirical evidence suggests that COs are only occasionally invited to participate in consultations with state officials and state agencies and that this takes place according to the will of those in the position to issue such invitations. No group has an official right to participate in the formulation of policies or legislation, such as a new law on marriage and family -something that would be important for COs that want to secure equal rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people and to see same-sex marriage allowed by law. As far as we know, COs are excluded from participating in the final stages of the policy-formulation process. We assume that they are explicitly and deliberately excluded from such decision making. 20 20 In the current (second) phase of the project, mentioned in footnote 1, these conditions and their ramifications are being explored in detail. The data from the second phase of our survey, however, show that at least some specific COs are invited to participate in policy consultations on a regular basis. Wischermann, Bui, Nguyen, Dang, Nguyen: children and drop-outs") and the "three cleans" ("Clean house, clean kitchen, and clean street"). 22 The representative's understanding of the role of women was similar to the state's:
Women should preserve "the happiness in their families [and] learn more knowledge in order to preserve their families." The interviewee was keen to stress that "the center always follows the directions of the government, so the point of view of our center is similar to the directions of the government."
In a similar way, the representative of the NGO Life, also based in Ho Chi Minh City, did not see differences between the organization's idea of the role(s) of women and the state's.
However, Life's representative explicitly rejected any state influence:
Without the government, Life will still do its job well because Lifeʹs mission is to improve the quality of life for vulnerable people, and […] women are the most vulnera- 
Conclusion
The findings presented in this paper make clear that most if not all of the Vietnamese COs included in this study are strongly influenced by the Vietnamese state, the Communist Party, and the organizational principles that both make use of. 24 To be more precise, the impact of two forms of state power (infrastructural power and discursive power) is strong, though to a varying degree and extent: whereas the impact of infrastructural power in general is strong and appears to have almost the same impact on all types of COs, the discursive power of the state and its impact seem to be much weaker and to vary according to the subject of the discourse and the type of CO.
More specifically, the state's infrastructural power impacts the internal decision making of mass organizations, professionals' organizations, business organizations and at least some NGOs and faith-based organizations, and to a certain extent also the activities they choose.
Here the influence of the party (in the sense that the groups' members follow the party's directives) and the use of mechanisms related to democratic centralism impact how decisions 23 In the current phase of the research project, mentioned in footnote 1, this thesis is being explored in detail.
24 In the case of faith-based organizations, the impact of religious hierarchies, societal and cultural traditions, etc.
might have an impact that outweighs the influence the party and the state have on those organizations. Selznick (1949) terms co-optation.
The state's discursive power seems to impact fewer NGOs and faith-based organizations, at least as far as gender and gender-equality-related norms are concerned. These organizations stick to positions that are different from the party and the state's position(s) or at least imply a critical distance from the party and the state. These organizations have the potential to build an effective counterweight to the state and its use of discursive power, at least in terms of gender norms and practices related to those norms.
These empirical results build on and reaffirm the results of previous research on associationalism under authoritarian constraints. They do so in the following respects:
-Our results make clear that certain "conditions" impact the development of Vietnamese
COs. More specifically, these "conditions" are a strong state, the Marxist-Leninist party that rules it, and the set of roles that COs play. It is in this context that Alagappa's (2004) findings, which say that in Asia the state has a strong impact on the development of COs, -Our research once more reconfirms that COs should be seen as "neutral multipliers" (Berman 2003: 266) . Research on COs should not start from the assumption that these organizations are harbingers of democracy or supporters of authoritarian rule. It is more fruitful to see them as part of the whole societal-political complex and of societal conflicts, all of which constitute the state. This includes the realization that COs are themselves the site of societal conflicts, are part of specific practices of state power exertion, and can be sites of countervailing practices. In the case of Vietnam, mass organizations, professionals' organizations, and business organizations are more often than not part of a specific structure of domination, whereas other types of COs tend to be countervailing forces. Indeed, COs are "polyvalent," as Kößler (1994) once aptly put it. sensitize actors to problems related to authoritarianism. They should also assist in improving intra-organizational processes to make them more inclusive, accountable, and transparent.
Furthermore, donors should further strengthen the discursive power of NGOs and faithbased organizations in terms of their critique of state-and party-supported gender norms and gender-related practices. Not only is gender a central component in the field of state hegemony, but COs can also help improve gender relationships, thus making the state and society more inclusive and equal. The latter is an important goal, especially in a country that calls itself a "Socialist Republic."
